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Debt cycles, instability and fiscal rules: 
a Godley-Minsky synthesis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Wynne Godley and Hyman Minsky were two macroeconomists who ‘saw the crisis coming’.1 In 1999 
Godley published his well-known article on the ‘seven unsustainable processes’ in the US economy 
(Godley, 1999). In this article he argued that the rising indebtedness of the US private sector was 
unsustainable and, therefore, private expenditures could not be considered as a source of steady growth 
in the medium run. He also pointed to the unsustainability of the rising US net foreign indebtedness. 
Using a stock-flow consistent analytical framework, Godley argued that without a change in fiscal 
policy stance or an important rise in net exports, the US economy was doomed to witness a severe 
recession and a sharp rise in unemployment. These warnings were repeated in his publications as a head 
of the Levy Economics Institute’s macro-modelling team (see, e.g. Godley, 2003, 2005; Godley et al., 
2005). The 2007-9 crisis verified Godley’s fears: the US economy contracted sharply and the 
unemployment rate increased substantially.2 
 
Minsky (1975, 1982, 2008) developed a theory that explains how indebtedness can increase in periods 
of tranquillity as a result of endogenous forces that reduce the desired margins of safety of economic 
units. This gradual reduction in the desired margins of safety was considered by Minsky as the reason 
behind the increasing financial fragility that accompanies economic expansion and periods of stability. 
According to his financial instability hypothesis, the increasing fragility makes the macro systems more 
prone to shocks that reduce the ability of borrowers to repay their debt. These shocks can lead to 
severe economic recessions. The processes described in Minsky’s analysis are broadly in line with the 
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pre-crisis developments in the US and other advanced economies that ultimately led to the Great 
Recession.   
 
The emphasis that Godley and Minsky placed on financial relationships as sources of cycles and 
instability enabled them to provide some very important insights into the dynamics of modern 
macroeconomies. However, they did so from quite different angles. Godley concentrated more on the 
macroeconomic relationships between the private, the government and the foreign sector and 
postulated that in the medium to long run the fluctuations in financial balances and growth are driven 
by some exogenous stock-flow norms. Minsky, on the other hand, focused more on the relationships 
within the private sector (primarily on the financial relationships between firms and banks) and 
explained the macroeconomic fluctuations by considering endogenous changes in norms and valuations 
of risk.  
 
Although it is widely held that Godley’s and Minsky’s perspectives are both important for the 
explanation of macroeconomic dynamics, there is still a lack of a formal framework that synthesises 
them. On the one hand, there is a large literature on formal Minskyan models that capture various 
dynamics related to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis; see, for example, Taylor and O’Connell 
(1985), Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011), Passarella (2012), Keen (2013), Ryoo (2013A), Nikolaidi (2014), 
Charles (2016) and the references therein. However, none of these models include explicitly insights 
from Godley’s projection analyses. On the other hand, there are some theoretical stock-flow consistent 
models that utilise aspects of Godley’s projection approach, but make no explicit links to Minskyan 
dynamics (e.g. Godley and Lavoie, 2007; Martin, 2008; Leite, 2015).    
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple macrodynamic model that makes a Godley-Minsky 
synthesis. The model concentrates on certain aspects of Godley’s and Minsky’s approaches that are 
deemed more important for a simplified explanation of debt cycles and instability in a national 
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macroeconomy. The key features of the model and the principal results of the analysis are the 
following. 
 
First, as in Godley’s projection analyses, the model economy consists of three sectors: the private 
sector, the government sector and the foreign sector. This permits an explicit consideration of Godley’s 
financial balances approach that explains the interlinkages between these sectors and the resulting 
effects on debt accumulation and growth. Remarkably, Godley’s financial balances approach is broadly 
in line with Kalecki’s profit equation that was used by Minsky.  
 
Second, drawing on Godley, the private sector’s propensity to spend is driven by a stock-flow norm 
(the target net debt-to-income ratio). It is shown that, under certain conditions, the interaction between 
the propensity to spend and net private indebtedness generates cycles and instability. Instability is more 
likely when the propensity to spend responds strongly to deviations from the stock-flow norm. A 
paradox of debt result arises: the more the private sector and its lenders attempt to put net private 
indebtedness under control, by adjusting private expenditures, the more the net private debt ratio 
destabilises.      
 
Third, following Minsky, it is assumed that the stock-flow norm varies endogenously as a result of 
changes in the expectations and the conventions of borrowers and lenders during the economic cycle. 
It is shown that this endogeneity can give rise to Godley-Minsky debt cycles and it is a source of 
instability. Instability is more likely when the stock-flow norm is highly sensitive to the economic cycle.   
 
Fourth, two different fiscal rules are introduced: a Maastricht-type fiscal rule, according to which the 
fiscal authorities adjust the government expenditures based on a target net government debt ratio; and a 
Godley-Minsky fiscal rule, which links government expenditures with private indebtedness following a 
counter-cyclical logic. Simulation analysis illustrates that the Maastricht-type fiscal rule is destabilising 
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while the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule is stabilising. Apart from supporting the view that counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy has positive effects on the stabilisation of output, this result suggests that counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy is also conducive to the stabilisation of government indebtedness. Moreover, it is shown 
that the paradox of debt can apply to the government sector: the more the fiscal authorities attempt to 
target a specific government debt ratio, by adjusting the government expenditures, the more this ratio 
destabilises. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the structure of the model. Section 3 explores the 
interaction between private sector’s propensity to spend and net private indebtedness when the target 
net private debt-to-income ratio and government expenditures are exogenous. Section 4 endogenises 
the target net private debt-to-income ratio and studies how Godley-Minsky cycles can arise. It also 
examines the implications of this endogeneity for instability. Section 5 introduces fiscal rules and 
analyses their (de)stabilising effects. Section 6 summarises and concludes.  
 
2. Structure of the model  
 
We consider an economy that consists of three sectors: the private sector (which includes households, 
non-financial firms and banks), the government sector and the foreign sector. The transactions that 
take place between the sectors of the economy are shown in Table 1. The balance sheet matrix, which 
depicts financial assets/liabilities, is shown in Table 2. The symbols used in the model are reported in 
Appendix A. The identities of the model that stem from the transactions/balance sheet matrices and 
national accounting are presented in Appendix B1.   
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
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The total output of the economy is determined by aggregate expenditures (see equation B1 in Appendix 
B1). All sectors of the economy accumulate financial assets and financial liabilities. The net debt of each 
sector is equal to its financial liabilities minus its financial assets. A sector is a net debtor when its net 
debt is positive and a net creditor when its net debt is negative.  
 
The private sector invests in tangible capital goods. If the saving of this sector is not enough to cover 
the investment expenditures, net private debt increases (equations B3 and B4 in Appendix B1). The 
government sector collects taxes and makes primary expenditures by purchasing goods produced by the 
private sector. When total expenditures (which include net interest payments) are higher than taxes, net 
government debt increases (see equation B5 in Appendix B1). The private sector has trade and financial 
relationships with the foreign sector. The net debt of the foreign sector increases when the trade 
balance (exports minus imports) is higher than the net interest income received from the foreigners (see 
equations B6 and B7 in Appendix B1).  
 
For simplicity, the following assumptions have been made: the interest rate is exogenously determined 
by the monetary authorities and is the same for both the private and the government net debt;3 the 
price level is set equal to unity; there are no changes in asset prices and exchange rates that could affect 
the value of assets and liabilities (and, thus, the value of net debt).  
 
Due to national accounting, the sum of the net debt of the three sectors of the economy is equal to 
zero (see Table 2 and equation B7 in Appendix B1). This, for example, means that when the net debt of 
the domestic economy declines, the net debt of the foreign sector increases. National accounting also 
implies that the sum of the balances of the three sectors of the economy is equal to zero (see equation 
B8 in Appendix B1).4 This reflects Godley’s financial balances approach and implies that the balance of 
one sector cannot improve without a deterioration in the balance of at least one of the other two 
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sectors.5 For example, if the government sector desires to decrease its deficit to a specific level then the 
private sector and/or the foreign sector should be willing to accept a deterioration of their balances in 
an accurately offsetting manner. Otherwise, the intended decline in deficit cannot be attained. 
Moreover, since most components of the financial balances are also components of the aggregate 
demand, any attempt of the sectors to improve their balances may lead to lower output if the other 
sectors do not desire to experience lower balances.  The financial balances approach has been widely 
used by Godley himself and other scholars to analyse the macroeconomic developments in the US and 
other economies (see e.g. Godley et al., 2007; Zezza, 2009; Brecht et al., 2012; Sawyer, 2012; Wolf, 
2012).  
 
A distinguishing feature of the financial balances approach is the consolidation of households, firms 
and banks into one single private sector. This implies that in our model the transactions between 
households, firms and banks are not taken explicitly into consideration. Moreover, the assets and the 
liabilities of the private subsectors that are counterparts of the assets and liabilities of other private 
subsectors are netted out in the estimation of net private debt. The net private debt refers, therefore, 
solely to the net liabilities of the private sector that are net assets of the government and the foreign 
sector. Although this consolidation is a great simplification with various limitations (see Dos Santos and 
Macedo e Silva, 2010 and Martin, 2012 for a discussion), it has proved quite useful in Godley’s 
projections and other empirical analyses that focus on the interaction between private sector’s 
behaviour, fiscal policy and foreign balance. Moreover, it serves the purposes of our simple skeleton 
that intends to capture the dynamics of a national macroeconomy by using a high-level aggregation.  
 
In the model private expenditures ( P ) include the consumption and the investment expenditures of 
households and firms. Private sector’s propensity spend out of its income ( p ) is defined as the ratio of 
private expenditures to private sector’s income:6 
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p
−
=  (1) 
 
where Y  is the output of the economy and T  denotes taxes.  
 
Equation (2) defines the primary government expenditures (G )-to-output ratio: 
 
Y
G
g =  (2) 
 
The net private debt ( PD )-to-income ratio is given by: 
 
TY
D
d PP
−
=  (3) 
 
Equation (4) gives the net government debt ( GD )-to-output ratio: 
 
Y
D
d GG =  (4) 
 
As in most Godley’s models, taxes and imports (M ) are proportional to the output of the economy 
( 0, m ):  
 
YT =  (5) 
mYM =  (6) 
 
Moreover, exports ( X ) are assumed to grow at an exogenously given rate, Xg  (see, e.g., Godley and 
Lavoie, 2007, p. 98):  
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XgX X=
  (7) 
 
This exogenous rate relies on factors such as the economy’s structural competiveness and the income 
of the foreign sector, which are taken as given.  
 
The behaviour of the private sector is determined using insights from both Godley and Minsky. Godley 
argued that the private sector targets in the long run a specific stock of net financial assets as a 
proportion of its disposable income (a stock-flow norm). He also postulated a formula which states that 
the balance of the private sector adjusts in order for this desired stock to be attained (see Godley and 
Cripps, 1983; Godley, 1999; Godley and Lavoie, 2007).7 In our model this idea is captured by the 
following equation: 
 
( ) ][ pddpp PTPB −−+=   (8) 
 
where Bp  is a benchmark value of the propensity to spend which is used as a reference, TPd  is the 
target net private debt-to-income ratio,   is a positive function of )( P
T
P dd −   – hence 0T
Pd
  and 
0
Pd
  – and   is an adjustment parameter ( 10   ). The private sector has a desired propensity to 
spend, captured by the term ( )PTPB ddp −+  . ( ) 0=− PTP dd  when PTP dd = , ( ) 0− PTP dd when 
P
T
P dd   and ( ) 0− PTP dd  when PTP dd  . Hence, when TPd  is higher (lower) than Pd , the desired 
propensity to spend is higher (lower) than the benchmark value, Bp , since the private sector desires to 
spend more (less) in order to achieve the target debt ratio. According to equation (8), there is a gradual 
adjustment of the actual propensity to spend towards the desired one.  
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Three points are in order. First, we assume that the function ( )PTP dd −  is continuous, differentiable 
and bounded from above and below. The boundedness is justified by the fact that the propensity to 
spend of the private sector cannot deviate significantly from the benchmark value that is used as a 
reference. Hence, as the difference between TPd  and Pd  increases, the impact of the target debt ratio on 
the propensity to spend diminishes because the private sector wishes to keep the propensity to spend 
relatively close to its benchmark value.  
 
Second, TPd  is not only set by the private sector itself. It is also set by the government and, most 
importantly, by the foreign sector that are potentially lenders/borrowers of the private sector. For 
instance, a rise in TPd  might capture a rise in the willingness of foreign investors to lend to the private 
sector of a national economy (households, firms or banks). Therefore, a change in the propensity to 
spend reflects the decisions of both the private sector and its lenders/borrowers. Interestingly, equation 
(8) can capture changes in private expenditures caused by capital inflows and capital outflows. For 
example, the inequality P
T
P dd   may reflect periods in which the net debt of the private sector is 
considered by foreign lenders as sufficiently small. In such periods the existence of a low perceived 
lender’s risk induces higher capital inflows that lead to higher private expenditures relative to income. 
On the other hand, the inequality P
T
P dd   may capture periods of capital outflows in which the lender’s 
risk is perceived to be high. 8   
 
Third, although a change in the propensity to spend is the primary means through which the private 
sector can affect its net indebtedness, it may not have the desired outcomes. As will become clear 
below, the decision for spending affects the output of the economy and, therefore, has feedback effects 
on the net private debt-to-income ratio.  
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Godley postulated that the stock-flow norm is exogenous. However, such an assumption can be 
considered satisfactory only as a first approximation. In reality, economic units’ desired margins of 
safety, which determine the stock-flow norm, change endogenously during the economic cycle. Minsky 
(2008, pp. 193, 209) argued that during periods of expansion – when the outstanding debts are serviced 
without significant problems – the desired margins of safety of borrowers and lenders decline. This 
happens because the recent good performance of the economy and the favourable credit history induce 
economic units to accept financial structures that were previously assessed as risky. The opposite holds 
in periods in which the economic performance and credit history are not favourable.9  
 
Although Minsky’s arguments primarily refer to the behaviour of firms and banks, they can apply to 
any borrower-lender relationship and, therefore, to the financial relationships between the private 
sector of a national economy and its lenders/borrowers (the government and the foreign sector). 
Hence, drawing on the above-mentioned perspectives, we postulate the following specification:  
 
( ) ][ 0
T
PYY
B
P
T
P dggdd −−+= 
  (9) 
 
where Yg  is the actual economic growth, 0Yg  is the normal growth rate,   is a positive function of 
( )0YY gg −  – hence 0Yg  and 0Yg  –, 
B
Pd  is a benchmark value of the debt ratio which is used 
as a reference and   is an adjustment parameter ( 10  ). The term ( )0YYBP ggd −+   captures the 
debt ratio which is deemed as an acceptable target based on the contemporary economic, social and 
institutional conditions. We have ( ) 00 =− YY gg  when YY gg =0 , ( ) 00 − YY gg  when 0YY gg   
and ( ) 00 − YY gg  when 0YY gg  . In other words, when economic growth is higher (lower) than 
the growth rate conceived as normal, the acceptable target debt-to-income ratio of the private sector is 
higher (lower) than the benchmark debt ratio, BPd .10 Equation (9) shows that, due to conventional 
reasons, the target debt ratio gravitates slowly towards the acceptable target debt ratio.    
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The positive impact of economic growth on the target debt ratio introduces a self-reinforcing 
mechanism similar to the one suggested by Taylor (2004, p. 303). In his formulation, Taylor assumes 
that due to confidence reasons autonomous investment increases more when the investment rate is 
already high. Similarly, in our model, economic growth is driven up when economic growth is already 
high since favourable expectations lead borrowers and lenders to target a higher debt ratio, making 
private spending higher. As pointed out by Lavoie (2014, p. 446), Taylor’s (2004, p. 303) formulation 
draws on the model of Taylor and O’Connell (1985) – the first attempt to formalise Minskyan ideas. In 
their model, Taylor and O’Connell (1985) introduced a ‘state of confidence’ variable and showed how 
the interaction of expectations with asset prices can produce Minskyan dynamics. Although the crucial 
role of asset prices is not incorporated in our model,11 the Minskyan idea that expectations can produce 
destabilsing forces is a common feature between our model and the model of Taylor and O’Connell 
(1985). 
 
In equation (9) the function ( )0YY gg −  is assumed to be continuous, differentiable and bounded 
from above and below. The boundedness implies that the acceptable target debt ratio cannot deviate 
substantially from the benchmark net debt ratio which is used as a reference. Hence, when economic 
growth becomes very high or very low compared to the normal growth rate, the changes in the 
acceptable target debt ratio become small.   
 
The benchmark net debt ratio depends on deep economic, institutional and social factors (e.g. the 
degree of financialisation, the degree of openness of the domestic financial system, the prevailing 
consumption and investment norms, the society’s perception of the role of debt, etc.). When 0BPd , 
the private sector has a net debtor benchmark position; when 0BPd , it has a net creditor benchmark 
position. The benchmark net debt ratio is expected to change over a long-run horizon. For example, 
over the 1990s and the 2000s many advanced economies experienced a sustained reduction in the 
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balance of their private sector (see, for example, Tymoigne and Wray, 2014, pp. 107-112). It is very 
likely that this reduction partially reflected deep economic, institutional and social economic changes 
that took place over this period, such as financial deregulation, financial globalisation and the gradual 
prevalence of norms that were conducive to higher levels of consumption and debt. These fundamental 
changes probably moved the private sector in these countries towards a net debtor benchmark position.       
 
Overall, according to equation (9), the acceptable target net debt-to-income ratio depends on (a) cyclical 
changes in economic growth, reflected in ( )0YY gg − , and (b) deep long-run economic, institutional and 
social factors, captured by BPd . Following the distinction that Palley (2011) has made between the 
Minsky basic cycle and the Minsky super-cycle, it could be argued that the cyclical changes effects are 
related to the Minsky basic cycle, while the deep long-run factors have to do with the Minsky super-
cycle which has a longer time horizon. In this paper, BPd  is deemed constant and, therefore, emphasis is 
placed on the dynamics linked with the basic Minsky cycle. However, future extension of this model 
could allow BPd  to change endogenously permitting thereby the combination of the Minsky basic cycle 
with the Minsky super-cycle.12 
 
The government expenditures are determined by fiscal rules. Fiscal rules have been widely adopted over 
the past two decades or so. These rules impose constraints on fiscal aggregates, such as government 
debt and deficit (see IMF, 2009; Schaechter et al., 2012). We first consider a simple Maastricht-type rule 
which states that primary government expenditures (relative to output) decline when the net 
government debt-to-output ratio is higher than a specific target ( TGd ). Formally, this rule is written as 
follows: 
 
( )GTG ddg −=   (10A) 
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where 0 . Note that the essence of this rule would not change if the tax rate was used as a tool 
instead of the government expenditures.  
 
We then consider an alternative fiscal rule that departs from the conventional approach since it places 
no limits on any specific fiscal aggregate. On the contrary, its rationale is that fiscal policy should 
stabilise the macroeconomy by increasing (decreasing) government expenditures when the private 
sector exerts contractionary (expansionary) pressures as a result of its attempts to reduce (increase) its 
indebtedness. Formally:    
 
( ) ( )ggddg PTP −+−−= 021   (10B) 
 
where 021  , . The second term has been introduced to reflect the fact that government expenditures 
cannot deviate significantly from a benchmark value, 0g . Equation (10B) is consistent with the 
perceptions of both Godley and Minsky who emphasised that the government should intervene to 
offset fluctuations in economic activity that stem from the inherently unstable behaviour of the private 
sector.13 We thus call equation (10B) the ‘Godley-Minsky fiscal rule’. It should be pointed out that this 
rule is generally in line with the Keynesian counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  
 
As shown in Appendix B3, the growth rate of the economy is given by:  
 
( )
( ) gpm
gp
gg
Y
Y
XY
−−−+
+−
+==


11
1 
 (11) 
 
Using equations (B2), (B4), (1), (3), (5) and (11), we get:  
 
( )
( ) PYP
P
P dgrp
Y
Y
d
Y
D
d −+−=−
−
= 1
1



 (12) 
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Employing equations (B5), (2), (4), (5) and (11), we get: 
 
( ) GYG
G
G dgrg
Y
Y
d
Y
D
d −+−=−= 

  (13) 
 
Equations (12) and (13), in conjunction with (11), show that, when the private and the government 
sector decide to spend less (relative to income), the impact on their net debt-to-income ratios depends 
on whether they are net debtors or net creditors. If the net debt is positive, there are two counteracting 
effects. On the one hand, the decline in expenditures (i.e. in p and g) tends to reduce the net debt-to-
income ratios. We call this the ‘spending effect’. On the other hand, such a decline reduces Yg ; this 
places upward pressures on the positive net debt-to-income ratios by decreasing the denominator of 
these ratios. We call this the ‘growth effect’. However, when the net debt is negative, these two effects 
are mutually reinforcing. The reason is that a lower Yg  reduces the denominator in the negative net 
debt-to-income ratios making them more negative.    
 
Overall, the model can be summarised as a 5D (4D) dynamic system, which is reproduced below for 
convenience:14 
 
( ) PYP dgrpd −+−= 1  (12) 
( ) ][ pddpp PTPB −−+=   (8) 
( ) ][ 0
T
PYY
B
P
T
P dggdd −−+= 
  (9) 
( ) GYG dgrgd −+−=   (13) 
( )GTG ddg −=   (10A) 
( ) ( )ggddg PTP −+−−= 021   (10B) 
 
The unique steady state of the system is reported in Appendix B4. In the next sections the system will 
be analysed in three steps. In the first step (Section 3), the dynamic interaction between private sector’s 
propensity to spend and net private indebtedness will be examined assuming that the target net private 
debt-to-income ratio and the government expenditures-to-output ratio are exogenous. In the second 
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step (Section 4), the target net private debt-to-income ratio will be endogenised. In the third step 
(Section 5), the fiscal policy rules will be introduced. Our examination relies on analytical solutions and 
numerical simulations. The parameter values used in the simulation exercises and their justification are 
reported in Appendix C.15 
  
Prior to proceeding to this analysis, it is useful to point out that when economic growth is exogenous, 
the net private debt-to-income ratio and the net government debt-to-output ratio are stable when the 
growth rate of exports is higher than the interest rate (i.e. rg X  ; see Appendix B5). This implies that 
when economic activity is exogenous, the stability of the net debt ratios relies on the export 
performance of the economy and the stance of monetary policy. The lower the interest rate set by 
monetary authorities and the higher the export growth of the national macroeconomy, the higher the 
likelihood that the debt ratios will stabilise. In the dynamic analysis and the simulations that follow it 
will be assumed that rg X  . This will allow us to focus on the destabilising forces that stem from the 
Godleyan and Minskyan mechanisms described above. 
 
3. Interaction between private sector’s propensity to spend and net private 
indebtedness 
 
This section analyses the 2D subsystem consisting of equations (12) and (8). Our aim is to examine the 
dynamic interaction between private sector’s propensity to spend and net private indebtedness when 
the target net private debt-to-income ratio and government expenditures are exogenous. As shown in 
Appendix D, when the private sector has a net creditor benchmark position, equation (8) does not 
produce destabilising forces: the stabilising impact of a change in the propensity to spend is reinforced 
by the associated ‘growth effect’ (see also Section 2).16 On the contrary, when the private sector has a 
net debtor benchmark position, the likelihood that the system is unstable is higher the higher is the 
responsiveness of the propensity to spend to the divergence between the actual and the target net 
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private indebtedness (for a given ( )PTP dd −  this responsiveness is captured by  ). The rationale behind 
this result is straightforward: when the net private debt ratio is higher (lower) than the target one, any 
attempt of the private sector to reduce (increase) its indebtedness by reducing (raising) the propensity 
to spend has an adverse (favourable) impact on economic growth. When   is higher than a specific 
threshold * , this ‘growth effect’ dominates the ‘spending effect’ leading to instability. It is interesting 
to note that, as shown in Appendix D, *  increases when the interest rate declines or the growth rate of 
exports increases. This implies that adequate monetary and trade policy can, until some limit, prevent 
the destabilising forces that stem from the behaviour of the private sector.  
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
The stability properties of the 2D system are summarised in Table 3. Figure 1a illustrates the stability 
that arises when *   and 0BPd . When 
*  , the system is unstable (see Figure 1b). However, 
since, as shown in Appendix D, the system is bounded, instability gives rise to limit cycles.17 Figure 2 
presents how these cycles are reflected in the interaction between private indebtedness and private 
sector’s propensity to spend (we use the same parameter values as in Figure 1b). Suppose that the 
economy is initially in phase I. Since 2.0== BP
T
PP ddd , the private sector increases its propensity to 
spend, producing higher than steady-state growth. Simultaneously, net private indebtedness declines 
because the propensity to spend is not high enough. Phase I can be interpreted as a phase of recovery. 
As the net private debt-to-income ratio declines, p  continues to increase and eventually the economy 
enters phase II in which the propensity to spend is high enough to generate a rise in indebtedness. In 
this phase the economy continues to exhibit a high growth which, however, is accompanied by higher 
fragility. At some point, Pd  becomes very close to 
T
Pd . At that point the indebtedness of the private 
sector is conceived to be extremely high from the borrowers’ and/or lenders’ perspective. This causes a 
reduction in private sector’s propensity to spend. The economy enters a period of stagnation (phase III) 
where low growth coexists with rising net indebtedness. This rising indebtedness reduces further the 
17 
 
private sector’s propensity to spend. Indebtedness starts declining only when the propensity to spend is 
low enough to outweigh the adverse affects of low growth on the debt ratio. When this happens, the 
economy enters a new phase (phase IV) where economic growth remains low (since 
Pd  is still higher 
than TPd ). However, declining indebtedness sets the stage for the recovery that occurs when Pd  falls 
short of TPd . When this happens, a new cycle begins.  
 
<Insert Figure 1a here> 
<Insert Figure 1b here> 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
The cycles depicted in Figure 1b and Figure 2 could be characterised as ‘Godley cycles’, since they stem 
from private sector’s attempt to achieve an exogenous stock-flow norm by modifying its propensity to 
spend. These cycles are broadly in line with the empirical evidence provided by Koo (2013) according 
to which the saving behaviour of the private sector (motivated by the willingness to leverage or 
deleverage) was the principal driver of expansions and contractions in many advanced economies over 
the last decades.   
 
The fact that a higher value of   can lead to cycles and instability has an interesting interpretation. It 
implies that the more the private sector and its lenders attempt to put net private indebtedness under 
control by adjusting private expenditures, the more the private debt ratio destabilises. Arguably, this is a 
paradox of debt result. Although the adjustment of the propensity to spend seems to be a sensible 
behaviour for the control of private indebtedness, the resulting macroeconomic effects prevent the 
realisation of the desired indebtedness.18 
 
Since g  is constant in the 2D subsystem, net government indebtedness is exclusively driven by the 
‘growth effect’: when economic growth is high (low) enough the net government debt-to-output ratio 
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declines (increases). As shown in Figure 2, this ‘growth effect’, which in the 2D subsystem is exclusively 
linked to the behaviour of the private sector, is sufficient to destabilise the net government debt-to-
output ratio. Therefore, private sector’s attempt to achieve its desired stock-flow norm can destabilise 
public indebtedness despite the fact the government sector is passive. However, the constancy of g  
has as a result that the government balance does not change significantly relative to the other two 
balances. Consequently, any deterioration or improvement in the balance of the private sector is almost 
entirely mirrored in the balance of the foreign sector.  
 
4. Endogenising the targeted net private indebtedness  
 
We now allow the target net private debt-to-income ratio to change endogenously according to 
equation (9); g  is still kept at its steady-state value. As shown in Appendix E, the introduction of an 
endogenous change in the target net private debt-to-income ratio can transform an otherwise stable 
system of Pd  and p  into an unstable one. Instability arises when the responsiveness of the target net 
private debt-to-income ratio to changes in economic growth (which is captured by   for a given 
( )0YY gg −  ) is higher than a specific threshold 
*  (see Table 3). Figure 3 illustrates this in our 
simulations.19 The figure refers to a private sector that has a net creditor benchmark position (similar 
results arise when a net debtor benchmark position is considered). It can be seen that the stability 
properties of the 3D subsystem change as   increases: although the system is stable for low values of 
 , it becomes unstable when   becomes higher than 050.*  .  
 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
 
The underlying mechanism can be explained as follows. In periods of low growth, when net private 
indebtedness is high, the deterioration in borrowers’ and lenders’ expectations induces them to target a 
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lower net debt ratio than the benchmark one ( BPd ); recall that in the 2D subsystem 
B
P
T
P dd = . Therefore, 
the difference between the actual and the target ratio increases, producing a greater decline in the 
propensity to spend (and therefore in economic growth) compared to the 2D subsystem. Inversely, in 
periods of high growth, in which net private indebtedness is low, the favourable expectations due to the 
good performance of the economy make the perceived risk lower. This leads to a higher target net debt 
ratio than the benchmark one and, hence, to a more significant rise in the propensity to spend. This 
results in higher economic growth. The greater fluctuations in both the propensity to spend and 
economic growth are reflected in the law of motion of the net debt ratio. If   is sufficiently high, these 
fluctuations ultimately lead to instability. 
 
As shown in Figure 4 and Appendix E, instability gives rise to perpetual cycles. The emergence of 
cycles stems from the fact that the desired propensity to spend and the acceptable target debt ratio 
cannot deviate substantially from their benchmark values. Hence, we overall have that an otherwise 
stable Godley system can exhibit cyclical behaviour when it is combined with the Minskyan 
endogeneity of the stock-flow norm.  
 
<Insert Figure 4 here> 
 
5. Introducing fiscal rules  
 
We now turn to examine how the stability of the macro system changes when fiscal rules are 
introduced. Figure 5 illustrates the dynamic adjustment of the system when fiscal authorities adopt a 
Maastricht-type fiscal rule (equation 10A). Figure 6 shows the dynamic adjustments when a Godley-
Minsky fiscal rule is implemented (equation 10B). In both simulation exercises the parameter values 
that refer to equations (8), (9) and (12) are the same with those used in the simulations presented in 
Figure 3. Moreover, the same range of values for   has been employed and the case in which 0BPd  
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has again been considered. This allows us to specify how the dynamic adjustments of the macro system 
are modified as a result of the introduction of fiscal rules.  
 
Consider first the Maastricht-type fiscal rule. Comparing the simulation results between Figure 3 and 
Figure 5, it can be observed that instability increases as a result of the implementation of this fiscal rule: 
first, for high values of   the cycles become much more intense; second, instability gradually arises 
even for low values of  . Intuitively, the following mechanisms are at play. Whenever economic 
growth is low (as a result of high net private indebtedness) there is a tendency for the net government 
debt-to-output ratio to increase. At some point during the period of low growth, the government debt 
ratio becomes higher than TGd . To guarantee fiscal discipline the government responds by reducing the 
expenditures-to-output ratio. This magnifies the contractionary effects that stem from the behaviour of 
the private sector: at a first place, economic growth is adversely affected by the decrease in g ; at a 
second place, this additional decline in growth enhances the deterioration in the expectations reducing 
further TPd ; other things equal, the divergence between Pd  and 
T
Pd  increases with destabilising effects 
on growth, private expenditures and net private debt. When the private sector has a net debtor 
benchmark position there is an additional channel through which the difference between Pd  and 
T
Pd  
increases: lower growth resulted from fiscal stance places upward pressures on Pd . The inverse 
mechanisms are at work when economic growth is high. This implies that the Maastricht-type fiscal rule 
increases the amplitude of debt and economic cycles.20 
 
Importantly, the induced instability refers not only to the private sector but also to the government 
sector. Figure 5 illustrates that, as time passes, the Maastricht-type fiscal rule generates significant 
fluctuations in both the net government debt-to-output ratio and the government balance (as a 
proportion of output). These fluctuations are much more severe than those observed in Figure 3. This 
result stems from the amplification of the economic cycles described above. Therefore, in an economy 
in which the private expenditures respond to changes in net private indebtedness and the targeted 
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indebtedness is endogenous, the currently fashionable debt brake rules do not only seem to destabilise 
the private sector but they may also be ineffective in ensuring fiscal prudence. Actually, a paradox of 
debt result arises: the more the fiscal authorities attempt to target a specific government debt ratio, by 
adjusting the government expenditures, the more this ratio destabilises.21 
 
<Insert Figure 5 here> 
 
On the other hand, the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule suggested here is capable of stabilising both the 
private economy and the government sector for high values of  , playing a similar role as the 
traditional Keynesian counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Figure 6 indicates this. After some fluctuations in 
the initial periods (which are much less intense than the fluctuations in Figure 5) all macro variables 
converge towards their steady-state values. Economically, this can be explained as follows. When 
economic growth is low due to high net private indebtedness, the implementation of the Godley-
Minsky fiscal rule produces a rise in the government expenditures-to-output ratio. This has favourable 
effects on economic growth since it tends to reduce the divergence between Pd  and 
T
Pd  by placing 
upward pressures on TPd . As alluded to above, the reduction of this divergence is conducive to stability. 
In high-growth phases the government expenditures-to-output ratio falls, slowing down the economic 
growth that is caused by the behaviour of the private sector. This again tends to reduce the difference 
between Pd  and 
T
Pd  via the impact on 
T
Pd . Consequently, fiscal policy reduces the amplitude of the 
cycles by suppressing the destabilising forces that stem from the endogenous changes in the desired 
margins of safety. This is also beneficial to the government sector itself. Since after some periods the 
fluctuations in economic growth decline, the same happens to the government balance (as a proportion 
of output) and the net government debt ratio. Therefore, although at a first place there might be some 
adverse developments in the fiscal performance, in the medium to long run fiscal prudence is 
safeguarded under the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule.      
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Interestingly enough, the simulations in Figure 6 indicate that the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule is not 
stabilising when   is close to zero, i.e. when the target net debt ratio of the private sector does not 
change endogenously (or changes only slightly). The reason is that Figure 6 refers to a private sector 
that has a net creditor benchmark position. As explained in Section 2, in this case a higher (lower) 
growth rate tends to increase (decrease) the private sector’s actual net debt ratio – this is exactly the 
opposite to what happens when the private sector has a net debtor benchmark position. Hence, when, 
for example, TPP dd   (i.e. the private sector does not spend enough), the increase in growth caused by 
the counter-cyclical government expenditures leads to a rise in Pd  which does not facilitate the 
convergence of Pd  towards 
T
Pd . This implies that when   is close to zero, the counter-cyclical effects of 
the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule are not conducive to stability. This, however, does not hold when the 
private sector has a net debtor benchmark position ( 0BPd ). In this case, the Goldey-Minsky fiscal rule 
is stabilising even when   is close to zero.    
 
<Insert Figure 6 here> 
 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 provide an additional comparison of the performance of the Maastricht-type and 
the Godley-Minsky fiscal rules. Figure 7 shows how the macro system responds under the two different 
rules when the growth rate of exports goes down due to an exogenous shock (for example, because of a 
decline in the income of the foreign sector). In the case of the Maastricht-type fiscal rule, the induced 
decline in the growth rate of output increases the debt ratio of the government, leading to a reduction 
in government expenditures that reinforces the contractionary process. As illustrated in Figure 7 (I), 
this initiates a period of instability whereby cycles become much more severe as time passes. On the 
other hand, under the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule, the cycles are very mild (Figure 7 (II)). Thus, although 
the growth rate of output becomes permanently lower (due to the deterioration in the export 
performance) and the government debt-to-output ratio becomes, thus, slightly higher, the Godley-
Minsky fiscal rule prevents the economy from entering into a period of instability.    
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<Insert Figure 7 here> 
 
Figure 8 plots the adjustment of the macro system if the interest rate increases exogenously (for 
instance, because of a confidence crisis in the government bonds market). In our model a rise in the 
interest rate tends to increase public indebtedness, but its impact on the net debt ratio of the private 
sector depends on whether B
Pd  is positive or negative. If 0
B
Pd , a higher interest rate tends to increase 
private sector’s net debt ratio. If 0BPd , a rise in the interest rate increases the net interest payments, so 
it tends to reduce private sector’s net debt ratio. In Figure 8 we consider the more interesting case in 
which 0BPd  (the results obtained when 0
B
Pd  are similar).  The rise in the interest rate drives up the 
indebtedness of the private sector and thereby places downward pressures on the propensity to spend 
and the growth rate. It also causes an increase in the indebtedness of the government sector. Under the 
Maastricht-type fiscal rule, the rise in the government debt ratio leads to lower government 
expenditures. This does not help the economy recover from the fact that the private sector has reduced 
its spending. 
 
 On the contrary, the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule reacts to the increase in private indebtedness and not to 
the rise in public indebtedness. This means that fiscal authorities increase government expenditures, 
counterbalancing the decline in private spending. This stabilises macroeconomic activity and, as a result, 
all the macro variables. Hence, we overall have that the Maastricht-type fiscal rule is conducive to 
instability, while the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule helps the system stabilise after the interest rate shock. 
Note, though, that the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule is not able to change the fact that the new steady-state 
value of the government debt-to-output ratio is higher because of the higher interest rate. 
 
<Insert Figure 8 here> 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper developed a simple macrodynamic model that synthesises certain aspects of Godley’s and 
Minsky’s analytical frameworks. Using this model, it was first shown that Godley debt cycles are likely 
to arise as a result of the responsiveness of private sector’s propensity to spend to divergences between 
the actual and the target net private debt ratio (the stock-flow norm). These cycles are generated when 
the private sector has a net debtor benchmark position. Instability emerges when the responsiveness of 
the propensity to spend is sufficiently high. This is a paradox of debt result: the more the private sector 
and its lenders attempt to put net private indebtedness under control, by adjusting private expenditures, 
the more the net private debt ratio destabilises. This result is associated with the economic growth 
consequences of this adjustment which have destabilising feedback effects on net private indebtedness. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis indicated that when the target net private debt ratio is allowed to change 
endogenously via a Minsky mechanism an otherwise stable macro system can be transformed into an 
unstable one. This happens, in particular, when the expectations that determine the stock-flow norm 
are highly sensitive to the changes in economic performance. Godley-Minsky debt cycles can also be 
generated. These cycles are driven by the changes in euphoria and the perceptions of risk that affect 
Godley’s stock-flow norm.  
 
Lastly, the paper examined the implications of the developed framework for fiscal policy by 
investigating the (de)stabilising effects of a Maastricht-type fiscal rule and a Godley-Minsky fiscal rule. 
Simulation analysis illustrated that the Maastricht-type fiscal rule is destabilsing while the Godley-
Minsky fiscal rule is stabilising. The paradox of debt appears to apply to the government sector: the 
more the fiscal authorities attempt to target a specific government debt ratio, by adjusting the 
government expenditures, the more this ratio destabilises. Moreover, it was shown that the Maastricht-
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type fiscal rule increases the instability caused from adverse exogenous shocks that affect the interest 
rates or the export performance of an economy. Instead, the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule reduces 
significantly the instability generated from these shocks.  
 
The model of this paper and the results presented above bring to the fore the importance of Godley’s 
and Minsky’s perspectives on the inherent instability of the macroeconomy, the generation of debt 
cycles and the stabilising role of fiscal policy. Based on these perspectives, the paper provided a new 
look at the dynamics of the modern macroeconomies in which the financial relationships between the 
private, the government and the foreign sector play a crucial role. An important line of research would 
be to combine the Godley-Minsky cycles produced here, which focus on aggregate sectoral debt, with 
the traditional Goodwin cycles that concentrate on the intra-private sector relationships and the role of 
income distribution.22  
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Footnotes 
1 See, for example, Whalen (2008), Wolf (2008), Bezemer (2010) and Wray (2011, 2012). 
2 According to Godley et al. (2007) and Zezza (2009), the slight recession of 2001 was a first sign of the 
unsustainable processes in the US economy; a crisis was then prevented due to accommodative fiscal 
and monetary policies.    
3 The assumption that the interest rate is exogenous, and thus independent of the level of (private and 
government) indebtedness, seems quite restrictive. However, this assumption has been adopted because 
one of the purposes of this model is to show that indebtedness can be a source of cycles and instability 
even when it has no direct impact on the interest rates. Note, though, that the adverse effects that high 
indebtedness can have on the new debt inflow (by causing a rise in the interest rates) are implicitly 
incorporated in equations (8) and (10A) below.     
4 The balances of the three sectors as a proportion of output are presented in Appendix B2.  
5 For an analysis of this approach see, for example, Godley and Cripps (1983), Zezza (2009), Dos 
Santos and Macedo e Silva (2010), Brecht et al. (2012) and Wray (2012). Interestingly, Minsky also used 
some aspects of the financial balances approach (see, e.g., Minsky, 1982, pp. 5-6).  
6 For simplicity, in equations (1) and (3) we use the private sector’s income after taxes, but before the 
interest payments. 
7 See also Martin (2012) and Shaikh (2012).   
8 Interestingly, formula (8) shares some similarities with the recent macroeconomic analysis of Koo 
(2013) about what he calls a ‘balance sheet recession’. In this analysis Koo makes a distinction between 
periods in which the private sector maximises profits (‘Yang phases’) and periods in which the private 
sector minimises its debt (‘Yin phases’). In our model, the reduction in the private sector’s propensity 
to spend when P
T
P dd   resembles a ‘Yin phase’ à la Koo.  
9 See also Kregel (1997), Vercelli (2011) and Lavoie (2014, p. 446).   
10 Our formulation draws on Nikolaidi (2014) who assumes a positive impact of investment on the 
desired margins of safety of firms and banks. 
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11 For recent Minskyan models that incorporate explicitly this role see Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011), 
Passarella (2012) and Ryoo (2013A). 
12 For a Minsky model that formalises cycles with different time horizons see Ryoo (2013A). His model 
relies on a Harrodian perspective and concentrates on the interactions between households, firms and 
commercial banks. 
13 For a fiscal rule that relies on a similar rationale see Nikolaidi (2014). Interestingly, the Godley-
Minsky fiscal rule is in line with Koo’s (2013) proposition that during ‘Yin phases’ fiscal expansion is 
necessary in order to avoid deep recessions. 
14 When equation (10B) is utilised instead of (10A), the whole macro system is a 4D system since Gd   
has no feedback effects on the other state variables. 
15 In the simulations the function ( )PTP dd −  in equation (8) takes the form )]dd(tanh[ PTP −21  . 
Likewise, the function ( )0YY gg −  in equation (9) takes the form )]gg(tanh[ YY 021 − . The 
MATLAB codes for the simulations of this paper draw on Nikolaidi (2014). The codes are available 
upon request. 
16 Stability also arises in the marginal case in which the private sector is in a zero net debt benchmark 
position (i.e. 0=BPd ).    
17 Recent works that apply the limit cycle analysis to economic dynamic systems include Assous and 
Dutt (2013), Datta (2014), von Arnim and Barrales (2015), Ryoo (2016) and Stockhammer and Michell 
(2017).   
18 For the paradox of debt in the case of firms see, for example, Lavoie (1995), Passarella (2012) and 
Ryoo (2013B). 
19 For similar figures that show how changes in specific parameters affect the stability properties of 
dynamic systems, see Chiarella et al. (2012) and Nikolaidi (2014). 
20 For the destabilising effects of Maastricht-type fiscal rules see also Charpe et al. (2011, ch. 9). 
21 The potential application of the paradox of debt to the government sector has been briefly pointed 
out by Lavoie (2014, p. 19). 
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22 For the presentation of the Goodwin cycles and the combination of Goodwin’s model with 
Minskyan dynamics see Keen (1995), Grasselli and Costa Lima (2012), Sordi and Vercelli (2014) and 
Stockhammer and Michell (2017). 
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Appendix A: Glossary of variables and parameters 
Variable/parameter Definition
B F Balance of the foreign sector
b F Foreign balance-to-output ratio
B G Balance of the government sector
b G Government balance-to-output ratio
B P Balance of the private sector
b P Private balance-to-output ratio
C Consumption
D P Net private debt
d P Net private debt-to-income ratio
d P
B Benchmark net private debt-to-income ratio
d P
T Target net private debt-to-income ratio
D G Net government debt
d G Net government debt-to-output ratio
d G
T Target net government debt-to-output ratio
I Private sector's investment
G Primary government expenditures
g Primary government expenditures-to-output ratio
g X Growth rate of exports
g Y Growth rate of output
g Y0 Normal growth rate of output
m Imports-to-output ratio
M Imports
p Private sector's propensity to spend
p B Private sector's benchmark propensity to spend
P Private expenditures (consumption plus investment)
r Interest rate
S Private sector's saving
T Taxes
Y Output
Y P Private sectror's discposable income
X Exports
ζ 1 Parameter capturing the responsiveness of the private sector's acceptable target debt ratio to the gap 
between the actual and the benchmark growth rate
ζ 2 Parameter capturing the responsiveness of the private sector's acceptable target debt ratio to the gap 
between the actual and the benchmark growth rate
θ Parameter capturing the adjustment of the private sector's target net debt ratio towards the acceptable 
target debt ratio (the latter is affected by (g Y -g Y0 ))
κ 1 Reaction parameter in the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule
κ 2 Reaction parameter in the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule
λ Parameter capturing the adjustment of the private sector's propensity to spend towards the desired 
propensity to spend (the latter is affected by (d p
T -d p ))
μ Reaction parameter in the Maastricht-type fiscal rule 
ξ 1 Responsiveness of the private sector's desired propensity to spend to the gap between the target and 
the actual debt ratio
ξ 2 Responsiveness of the private sector's desired propensity to spend to the gap between the target and 
the actual debt ratio
τ Taxes-to-output ratio
Notational convention
Time derivative of variable x, i.e. x dtdxx /  
 
Note: In the simulations the function ( )PTP dd −  in equation (8) takes the form )]dd(tanh[ PTP −21  and the function ( )0YY gg −  
in equation (9) takes the form )]gg(tanh[ YY 021 − . 
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Appendix B: Additional equations of the model and algebraic details 
 
B1. Identities of the model 
 
MXGICY −+++=  (B1) 
PP rDTYY −−=  (B2) 
CYS P −=  (B3) 
PPP YPBD −=−=
  (B4) 
GGG rDTGBD +−=−=
  (B5) 
( )GPFF DDrMXBD +−−=−=  (B6) 
0=++ FGP DDD  (B7) 
( ) 0=++−=++ FGPFGP BBBDDD   (B8) 
 
Note that ICP += . 
 
B2. The balances of the three sectors as a proportion of output 
 
Combining equations (B2), (B4)-(B6) and (1)-(6), we get: 
 
)1)(1( −−−== P
P
P rdp
Y
B
b  (B9) 
G
G
G rdg
Y
B
b −−==   (B10) 
( ) GP
F
F ddr
Y
X
m
Y
B
b +−+−== 1  (B11) 
 
Note that 0=++ FGP bbb . This can be easily shown by substituting the ratio X/Y from equation 
(B13) into equation (B11). 
 
 
B3. The growth rate of output 
 
Combining equations (B1), (1), (2), (5) and (6), we get: 
 
( ) mYXgYpYY −++−= 1  (B12) 
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Solving (B12) for Y , yields: 
 
( ) gpm
X
Y
−−−+
=
11
 (B13) 
 
The denominator in equation (B13) must be positive (i.e. 0)1(1 −−−+ gpm  ) to ensure goods 
market stability. Differentiating equation (B13) with respect to time and dividing through by Y , gives 
the growth rate of the economy:  
 
( )
( ) gpm
gp
gg
Y
Y
XY
−−−+
+−
+==


11
1 
 (B14) 
 
 
B4. The steady state of the 5D (4D) system  
 
The system defined by equations (12), (8), (9), (13) and (10A) or (10B) has a unique steady state. The 
steady-state values (denoted by the subscript 0) of the state variables of the system are:  
 
B
P
T
PP ddd == 00  
T
GG dd =0  
( ) BBPX pdrgp =−+= 10  
( ) TGX drgg −+= 0  
 
Note that BPd  and 
T
Gd  are parameters. At the steady state we also have that: 
XY gg =0  
)1(0 −−=
B
PXP dgb  
T
GXG dgb −=0  
])1([0
T
G
B
PXF ddgb +−=   
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B5. Stability analysis of Pd
  and Gd  when economic growth is exogenous 
 
When economic growth is exogenous, p , g  and TPd  are at their steady-state values, and thereby 
0== gp  . Hence, according to equation (11), economic growth is equal to the growth rate of exports 
(i.e. XY gg = ). Under these conditions, from equations (12) and (13) we get:  
 
XPP grdd −=
  
XGG grdd −=
  
 
Stability requires that 0 PP dd
  and 0 GG dd . This holds when rgX  . As explained in Section 
2, this condition is assumed to be always true throughout the paper.  
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Appendix C: Parameter values in the simulations 
Parameter Fig. 1a Fig. 1b Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7 Fig. 8 Justification
2D system 2D system 2D system 3D system 3D system 5D system 4D system 5D (4D) system 5D (4D) system
r 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.027 Close to 0.026, which is the unweighted average of the long-term real 
interest rate for 35 EU and non-EU countries over the period 1961-
2014 (source: AMECO; code: ILRV).
g X 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.026 0.03 The baseline value is slightly higher than the interest rate, ensuring 
stability when the laws of motion of debt ratios are examined in 
isolation (see Section 2). 
τ 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 Close to 0.34, which is the unweighted average of the total tax burden 
(excluding imputed social contributions), as a proportion of GDP, for 
34 EU and non-EU countries over the period 1975-2014 (source: 
AMECO; code: UTAT).  
m 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 Close to 0.41 which is the unweighted average of the imports-to-GDP 
ratio for 43 EU and non-EU countries over the period 1960-2014 
(source: AMECO; codes: UMGS, UVGD).  
d G
T 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 Equal to 0.6 minus 0.3; 0.6 is the maximum accepted value of the 
gross public debt ratio according to the Maastricht criteria; 0.3 is the 
average difference between gross and net goveernment debt ratio in 
27 advanced countries over the period 2001-2012 (source: IMF, 
World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015 edition).
d P
B 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 Has been chosen such that the steady-state private balance (b P0 ) is 
slightly lower/higher than 0.
λ 0.005 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 Selected such that stability/instability is produced in the 2D subsystem
λ
* 0.0163 0.0163 0.0163 - - - - - 0.0163 Estimated based on the formula presented in Appendix D
ξ 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 Selected from a reasonable range of values
ξ 2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Selected from a reasonable range of values
θ 0 0 0 - 0.1 - - 0.1 0.1 Selected such that stability/instability is produced in the 3D subsystem
θ
* - - - 0.0503 0.0503 0.0503 0.0503 0.0503 - Estimated based on the formula presented in Appendix E
ζ 1 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 Selected from a reasonable range of values
ζ 2 0 0 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 Selected from a reasonable range of values
μ 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0.05 (0) 0.05 (0) Selected from a reasonable range of values
κ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 (0.1) 0 (0.1) Selected from a reasonable range of values
κ 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 (0.02) 0 (0.02) Selected from a reasonable range of values
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Appendix D: Stability analysis of the 2D subsystem  
 
Suppose that the variables g  and TPd  are kept at their steady-state values (i.e. 0gg =  and 
B
P
T
P dd = ). 
Then, for the 2D system consisting of equations (12) and (8) it can be proved that:  
(a) If 0BPd , the steady state of the system is locally stable.  
(b) If 0BPd , for a sufficiently high Pd  (i.e. 0
*  
Pd
) there exists a parameter value 0*   that 
satisfies the following properties: 
(i) For all ( )*, 0  the steady state of the system is locally stable.  
(ii) For all ( )+ ,*  the steady state of the system is locally unstable and the trajectories of ( )tp  
and ( )tdP  converge to a limit cycle.  
(iii) At * =  the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation (in other words, there exists a limit cycle 
around the steady state for some range of the parameter value   which is sufficiently close to * ).  
 
In order to prove the above proposition, we need to estimate the Jacobian matrix of the system.  This 
matrix, evaluated at the steady state, is: 
 






=
2221
1211
2
JJ
JJ
J D , 
 
where: 
( )
( ) 00
11
11
1
gpm
d
grddJ
Pd
B
P
XPP
−−−+
−
−−==

  
( )
( ) 00
12
11
1
1
gpm
d
pdJ
B
P
P
−−−+
−
+==

  
021 == PdPdpJ   
022 −== ppJ   
 
We have: 
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( )
( )



−
−−−+
−
−−=+=
00
22112
11
1
gpm
d
grJJ)J(Tr P
d
B
P
XD  
0)()( 122122112 −−−=−= PdXD grJJJJJDet   
 
Proof of (a):  
 
If 0BPd , then 0)( 2 DJTr ; recall that rg X   (see Appendix B5) and ( ) 011 00 −−−+ gpm   (see 
Appendix B3). Since )( 2DJDet  is always positive, the steady state is locally stable. □ 
 
Proof of (b-i):  
 
If 0BPd , then 0)( 2 DJTr  for sufficiently low values of  . By setting 0)( 2 =DJTr , we can find the 
critical value for   below which 02 )J(Tr D :  
 
( )
( )
( )
1
11
1
00
−
−−−+
−−
−−
=
gpm
d
gr
B
Pd
X
*
P


  
 
We assume that 
Pd
  is sufficiently high such that ( )( ) ( ) BPd dgpmP  −−−−+= 111 00
* . This 
ensures 0*  since rg X  . The steady state is locally stable when *  . □ 
 
Proof of (b-ii):  
 
If 0BPd  and *  , we have 0)( 2 DJTr . Hence, since )( 2DJDet  is always positive, the steady state 
is locally unstable.  
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It can be proved that the trajectories of ( )tp  and ( )tdP  are bounded. To prove that, we follow closely 
the methods used by Ryoo (2013A, 2016). We write the endogenous variables as a function of time. 
Due to the boundedness of function   in equation (8), in period s we have: 
 
( )( )  − sdd PTP  
 
where   is the lower bound and   is the upper bound of function  . 
 
Substituting from equation (8): 
 
( )
( ) 

 +− spp
sp
B

 
 
Multiplying by se , integrating over ],0[ t  and re-arranging, we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) dsepdsspedsspedsep
t
sB
t
s
t
s
t
sB  +++
0000
    
 
After some tedious algebra, we obtain: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )101 −+−−+ tBttB epptpeep    
 
Multiplying by te − : 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ttBttB epeptpepep   −−−− +−++−+ 0101  
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For all ],0[ t , 10  − te  . Hence, the above inequality can be re-written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) maxBBmin p}p,pmax{tp}p,pmin{p =++=  00  
 
This implies that ( )tp  is bounded from above and below.  
 
To prove the boundedness of ( )tdP , we use equation (12). For a given value of p  (i.e. 0=p ), there is 
a specific value of ( )pd
~
d PP =  that satisfies the condition: 
 
( ) ( ) 01 =−+−= pd
~
grpd PXP
    
 
Hence, when p  is given, the steady-state debt ratio is: 
 
( )
X
P
gr
p
pd
−
−
=
1~
  
 
Since 0− Xgr , ( ) 0

pd
~
P  (i.e. ( ))(
~
tpdP  is increasing in ( )tp ). We have also shown that the steady-
state debt ratio is stable (see Appendix B5). 
 
Since ( ) maxmin ptpp  , ( ) 0
~


pdP  implies ( ) ( )( ) ( )maxmin
~~~
pdtpdpd PPP  . We claim that ( )tdP  is 
bounded such that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) maxmaxminmin }
~
,0max{}
~
,0min{ PPPPPPP dpddtdpddd ==  
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To prove that, consider the following cases: 
(i) ( ) ( )min
~
pdsd PP   
(ii) ( ) ( )max
~
pdsd PP   
(iii) ( ) ( ) ( )maxmin
~~
pdsdpd PPP   
 
In Case (i) we have ( ) ( )( )spd
~
sd PP   since ( ) ( )( )spdpd PP
~~
min  . Because ( )pdP  is stable, we therefore 
get ( ) 0sd P . In Case (ii), we have ( ) ( )( )spdsd PP
~
  since ( ) ( )( )spdpd PP
~~
max  . Because ( )pdP  is 
stable, we therefore get ( ) 0sd P . Hence, we overall have that any trajectory that starts outside the 
interval ( ) ( )]
~
,
~
[ maxmin pdpd PP  is attracted to this interval.  
 
In Case (iii) we claim that any trajectory that starts inside the interval cannot escape from it. To prove 
this suppose that it can. Then, there must exist an ss   such that ( ) ( ) ( )]
~
,
~
[ maxmin pdpdsd PPP  . 
Without loss of generality, let us consider the case in which ( ) ( )min
~
pdsd PP  . Because of the 
continuity of ( )tdP  there must also exist an s   such that sss   and ( ) ( ) ( )min
~
pdsdsd PPP  . The 
mean value theorem implies that there exists an s   such that ssss   and 
( )
( ) ( )
0
−
−
=
ss
sdsd
sd PPP
 . This, however, is not consistent with the fact that ( ) 0'sdP  whenever 
( ) ( )min
~
pdtd PP  .  
 
Overall, it has been shown that the trajectories of ( )tp  and ( )tdP  are bounded. Since the steady state is 
unique and locally unstable, the Poincarè-Bendixson theorem implies that these trajectories converge to 
a limit cycle (for a similar use of the Poincarè-Bendixson theorem see, for example, Nikaido, 1996, ch. 
12, Datta, 2014 and Ryoo, 2016). □ 
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Proof of (b-iii):  
 
At * = , 0)( 2 DJDet  and 0)( 2 =DJTr . This implies that the characteristic equation of the system 
has a pair of pure imaginary roots. Furthermore, we have: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
11
1
11
1
0000
−
−−−+
−
−=








−
−−−+
−
−−=
=
= gpm
d
gpm
d
gr
d
d
)(Tr
d
d P
*
P
*
d
B
Pd
B
P
X










 
 
Since ( )( ) ( ) BPd dgpmP  −−−−+= 111 00
* , we have ( ) 0
= *
)(Tr
d
d



. This means that at 
* =  the real part of the imaginary roots is not stationary with respect to changes in   (note that the 
trace of the Jacobian matrix represents the real part of the roots). Therefore, the conditions for the 
existence of a Hopf bifurcation point are satisfied. □ 
 
 
45 
 
Appendix E: Stability analysis of the 3D subsystem  
 
Suppose that the steady state of the 2D subsystem consisting of equations (12) and (8) is stable and the 
variable g  is kept at its steady-state value (i.e. 0gg = ). Then, for the 3D system consisting of equations 
(12), (8) and (9) it can be proved that for a sufficiently high 
Y
g  (i.e. 0
*  
Y
g ) there exists a 
parameter value 0*  which satisfies the following properties: 
(i) For all ( )*, 0  the steady state of the system is locally stable.  
(ii) For all ( )+ ,*  the steady state of the system is locally unstable and the trajectories of ( )tp , 
( )tdP  and ( )td TP  exhibit cyclical fluctuations.  
(iii) At * =  the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation (in other words, there exists a limit cycle 
around the steady state for some range of the parameter value   which is sufficiently close to * ).  
 
In order to prove the above proposition, we need to estimate the Jacobian matrix of the system. This 
matrix, evaluated at the steady state, is: 
 










=
333231
232221
131211
3
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
J D , 
 
where: 
( )
( ) 00
11
11
1
gpm
d
grddJ
Pd
B
P
XPP
−−−+
−
−−==

  
( )
( ) 00
12
11
1
1
gpm
d
pdJ
B
P
P
−−−+
−
+==

  
( )
( ) 00
13
11
1
gpm
d
ddJ
T
Pd
B
PT
PP
−−−+
−
−==

  
021 == PdPdpJ   
022 −== ppJ   
023 == T
Pd
T
PdpJ   
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( )
( )
0
11
1
00
31 
−−−+
−
==
gpm
ddJ
PY dg
P
T
P 
  
( )
( )
0
11
1
00
32 
−−−+
−
−==
gpm
Z
pdJ
YgT
P 
  
( )
( ) 







−
−−−+
−
== 1
11
1
00
33
gpm
Z
ddJ
T
pY dgT
P
T
P


  
 
The characteristic equation of the system is: 
 
0)( 32
2
1
3 =+++= adadadd  
 
We have: 
 
(i) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) 


12
00
23322111 1
11
1
+−=








−
−−−+
−
−−=++−= D
dg
D JTr
gpm
Z
JTrJJJa
T
pY , 
where ( ) 02 DJTr  and 
( )
( ) 







−
−−−+
−
−= 1
11
1
00
1
gpm
Z T
pY dg


 . 
 
(ii) 
3332
2322
3331
1311
2221
1211
2
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
a ++=  or  
( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) 


222
00
22
11
1
+=








−
−−−+
−−
+= DD
Xdg
D JDetJTr
gpm
gr
JDeta
T
PY , 
where ( ) 02 DJDet  and 
( )( )
( )
( )D
Xdg
JTr
gpm
grT
PY
2
00
2
11
1
−
−−−+
−−
=


 . 
 
(iii) ( ) ( )DD JDet
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
JDeta 2
333231
232221
131211
33 =−=−=  
where ( ) 02 DJDet . 
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(iv) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) DDD JDetJDetJTraaab 22212321 −++−=−= . 
 
We assume that 
Y
g is sufficiently high such that 
( )
( )


−
−−−+
=
1
11 00*
T
P
Y
d
g
gpm
. Hence, 01   
and 1a  is thereby a negative function of  . Setting 01 =a  and solving for  , we obtain 
( ) 0121 =  D
a
JTr . Hence, for 1a  , 1a  is positive. Otherwise, 1a  is negative. 
 
The sign of 2a  is also ambiguous. We have the following cases:  
▪ Case I: 02  . 2a  is always positive.  
▪ Case II: 02  . 2a  is a negative function of  . Setting 02 =a  and solving for  , we obtain 
( ) 0222 −=  Da JDet . Hence, for 2a  , 2a  is positive. Otherwise, 2a  is negative. 
 
03 a  since ( ) 02 DJDet . 
 
The expression for b  can be written as: 
 
 ++= 2b  
 
where: 
21=A  
( ) ( )( )DD JDetJTrB 2122 )1( −+−=   
( ) ( )DD JDetJTr 22−=  
 
The quadratic equation 0=b  has two roots: 
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


2
42
1
−+−
=
Bb  



2
42
2
−−−
=
Bb  
 
It can be easily proved that 042 − B  both in Case I and Case II (the proof is available upon 
request). Hence, the two roots are always real.  The quadratic equation can therefore be expressed as: 
 
( )( ) 02121 =−−= bbb   
 
According to Vieta’s formulas, ABbb /21 −=+  and  /21 =bb . We always have 0 .  
 
In Case I, 0 .  Hence, 021 bb , which means that 1b  and 2b  are of opposite sign and 12 bb   . 
It follows that 0b  for all ( )21 , bb    and 0b  for all ( ) ( )+− 21, bb  . It can also be 
proved that 12 ab    (the proof is available upon request). 
 
In Case II, 0  and 0 .  Hence, 021 + bb   and 021 bb , implying that both 1b  and 2b  are 
positive. Since 21 bb   , it follows that 0b  for all ( ) ( )+− 12, bb   and 0b  for all 
( )12 , bb   . It can also be proved that 112 bab    and 122 bab    (the proof is available 
upon request). 
 
Proof of (i):  
 
Suppose 2* b = . If *  , then 0,,, 321 baaa . Therefore, according to the Routh-Hurwitz 
conditions, the steady state of the 3D subsystem is locally stable. □ 
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Proof of (ii):  
 
Suppose 2b*  = . If *  , then in Case I 0b . In Case II we have 0b  when 1b  ; also, 0b  
and 0, 21 aa  when 1
b  . Therefore, at least one of the Routh-Hurwitz conditions is always 
violated and, hence, the steady state of the 3D subsystem is locally unstable. 
 
In Appendix D is has been shown that the trajectories of ( )tp  and ( )tdP  are bounded. Since equation 
(9) has exactly the same structure as equation (8), the same method as the one used in Appendix D to 
prove the boundedness of ( )tp  can be employed to prove the boundedness of ( )td TP .  
 
Since the trajectories of the 3D subsystem are bounded and its steady state is unique and locally 
unstable, the system exhibits cyclical fluctuations (see also Ryoo, 2013A, 2016).  □ 
 
Proof of (iii):  
 
Suppose 2* b = . At * = , we have 0,, 321 aaa  and 0=b . This implies that the characteristic 
equation has a pair of pure imaginary roots and a negative real root. Therefore, to prove that *  is a 
Hopf bifurcation point, it suffices to show that 
( )
0


= *

, where   is the real part of the two 
imaginary roots. Asada and Semmler (1995) have proved that the condition 
( )
0


= *

 is 
equivalent to the condition 
( )
0


= *
b


 (see also Yoshida and Asada, 2007). 
 
We have: 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )DDD JDetJDetJTr
b
22122212 −+−=





 
 
Substituting * =  into the above expression we get:  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 044 22221
2
22122
*
−−=+−+−−=


=




DDDDD JDetJTrJDetJDetJTr
b
. 
□ 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1. Transactions matrix 
Current Capital
Primary gov. expenditures +G -G 0
Taxes -T +T 0
Exports +X -X 0
Imports -M +M 0
Private sector's investment +I -I 0
Private sector's saving -S +S 0
Interest -rD P -rD G -rD F 0
Change in net debt 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0
Private sector
Government sector Foreign sector Total
PD
+ GD+ FD+
 
Note: Plus signs indicate inflows/sources of funds and negative signs denote outflows/uses of funds.  
 
Table 2. Balance sheet matrix 
Private sector Government sector Foreign sector Total
Net debt +D P +D G +D F 0  
 
 
Table 3. Stability properties of the 2D and 3D systems 
d P
B
>0 d P
B
≤ 0
λ <λ* Stability Stability
λ ≥λ* Instability (cycles) Stability
d P
B
>0 & λ<λ* d P
B
≤ 0
θ<θ* Stability Stability
θ≥θ* Instability (cycles) Instability (cycles)
2D system
3D system
 
Note: Analytical details and proofs are provided in Appendix D and Appendix E. 
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Fig. 1a. Dynamic adjustments of the 2D system to a 5% negative shock in the net private debt-to-income ratio; 
private sector in a net debtor benchmark position ( 0BPd ); 016.0005.0
* =  . 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio ( Pd ) 
 
 
(c) Target net private debt-to-income ratio ( TPd ) 
 
 
(e) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
(b) Private sector’s propensity to spend ( p ) 
 
 
(d) Fiscal variables  
 
 
(f) Financial balances (in proportion of output) 
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Fig. 1b. Dynamic adjustments of the 2D system to a 5% negative shock in the net private debt-to-income ratio; 
private sector in a net debtor benchmark position ( 0BPd ); 016.01.0
* =  . 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio ( Pd ) 
 
 
(c) Target net private debt-to-income ratio ( TPd ) 
 
 
(e) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
(b) Private sector’s propensity to spend ( p ) 
 
 
(d) Fiscal variables  
 
 
 
(f) Financial balances (in proportion of output) 
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Fig. 2. Limit cycle in the 2D system; private sector in a net debtor benchmark position 
( 0BPd ); 016.01.0
* =   
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Fig. 3. Dynamic adjustments of the 3D system to a 5% positive shock in the net private debt-to-income ratio for 
varying values of  ; private sector in a net creditor benchmark position ( 0BPd ). 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio (
Pd ) 
 
 
(c) Target net private debt-to-income ratio ( TPd ) 
 
 
(e) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
(b) Private sector’s propensity to spend ( p ) 
 
 
(d) Net government debt-to-output ratio 
 
 
(f) Government balance-to-output ratio ( Gb ) 
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Fig. 4. Dynamic adjustments of the 3D system to a 5% positive shock in the net private debt-to-income ratio; 
private sector in a net creditor benchmark position ( 0BPd ); 05.01.0
* =  . 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio (
Pd ) 
 
 
(c) Target net private debt-to-income ratio ( TPd ) 
 
 
(e) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
(b) Private sector’s propensity to spend ( p ) 
 
 
(d) Fiscal variables 
 
 
 
(f) Financial balances (in proportion of output) 
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Fig. 5. Dynamic adjustments of the 5D system to a 5% positive shock in the net private debt-to-income ratio for 
varying values of  ; private sector in a net creditor benchmark position ( 0BPd ); Maastricht-type fiscal rule. 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio ( Pd ) 
 
 
(c) Target net private debt-to-income ratio ( TPd ) 
 
 
(e) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
(b) Private sector’s propensity to spend ( p ) 
 
 
(d) Net government debt-to-output ratio ( Gd ) 
 
 
(f) Government balance-to-output ratio ( Gb ) 
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Fig. 6. Dynamic adjustments of the 4D system to a 5% positive shock in the net private debt-to-income ratio for 
varying values of  ; private sector in a net creditor benchmark position ( 0BPd ); Godley-Minsky fiscal rule.
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio ( Pd ) 
 
 
(c) Target net private debt-to-income ratio ( TPd ) 
 
 
(e) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
(b) Private sector’s propensity to spend ( p ) 
 
 
(d) Net government debt-to-output ratio ( Gd ) 
 
 
(f) Government balance-to-output ratio ( Gb ) 
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Fig. 7. Dynamic adjustment of the 5D (4D) system to an exogenous reduction in the growth rate of exports (
Xg ) 
at 100=t under Maastricht-type fiscal rule (Godley-Minsky fiscal rule); private sector in a net creditor benchmark 
position ( 0BPd ). 
 
(I) Maastricht-type fiscal rule 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio ( Pd ) 
 
 
(b) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
(c) Fiscal variables 
 
 
(II) Godley-Minsky fiscal rule 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio (
Pd ) 
 
 
(b) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
 
(c) Fiscal variables 
 
 
 
 
Note: Before 100=t , the system is at its steady state. 
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Fig. 8. Dynamic adjustment of the 5D (4D) system to an exogenous increase in the interest rate at 100=t under 
Maastricht-type fiscal rule (Godley-Minsky fiscal rule); private sector in a net debtor benchmark position 
( 0BPd ).
 
(I) Maastricht-type fiscal rule 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio ( Pd ) 
 
 
(b) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
(c) Fiscal variables 
 
 
(II) Godley-Minsky fiscal rule 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio (
Pd ) 
 
 
 
(b) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
(c) Fiscal variables 
 
 
 
Note: Before 100=t , the system is at its steady state. Since 0BPd , we have 
*   to ensure the stability of the 2D subsystem.  
 
